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Abstract: 

Is mental illness in the brain or in the mind? The mind-body question is an old debate. Plato and Aristotle addressed it 2,400 years ago, and philosophers from Rene Descartes to John Searle have puzzled over how much of what we call the “mind” is independent from our physical biology. Science, in particular neuroscience, has increasingly sought to explain human consciousness in terms of brain chemistry, a direction that implicitly tethers our reasoning, emotions, motives, and behavior to neurochemical and electrical processes over which the individual has no control. In the neuroscientific view, mental disorders belong in the same class as any other organic deficit, such as heart, lung, or liver disease, and hence should be treated with the same level of care. Notwithstanding the science, however, many find it difficult to place any disease that can be brought on by emotional trauma, or treated by talking, on the same plane as such obviously physical conditions as cardiovascular disease or liver cancer. That might help explain why the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) specifically rejected mental illness arising from an inmate’s conditions of confinement as a valid subject for damage claims. To constitute a “real” violation in the eyes of the law, an injury must be documented by medical (i.e., physical) evidence. The PLRA’s exclusion suggests that mental illness that arises or worsens as a result of prison conditions cannot reliably meet the evidentiary standards required by a court of law. This article explores some of the history, principles and practices of the mind-brain problem with specific reference to prisons and jails and the exclusion of lawsuits seeking damages for mental illness under PLRA, and its consequences.

Keywords: Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); Solitary Confinement; Talk Therapy and Pharmacotherapy for Mental Disorders

Affiliations:  1: Contributing Editor.