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Shadow Trading Theory and Congress  


Author:  Brian A. Jacobs.; Thomas A. McKay.; Jessica Salley.


Source: Volume 58, Number 04, February 15 2025 , pp.41-50(10)




Review of Securities & Commodities Regulation

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Abstract: 

In 2024, a jury found a corporate insider liable under a new theory pursued by the SEC: “shadow trading,” in which an insider acts on material nonpublic information learned at the insider’s workplace to make a trade in an “economically linked” company — that is to say, one in the same or a similar industry. While this case, SEC v. Panuwat, signals a significant expansion of what conduct might be termed “insider trading,” it raises questions about what may happen to those in the United States who are most likely to possess industry-moving MNPI: the members of the U.S. Congress. This article details the extension of insider trading law that Panuwat represents, contrasting it to the stagnation that has marked attempts to expand accountability for U.S. lawmakers who trade on inside information. Finally, this article explores the methods some retail investors have devised to track and copy Congressional trades by harvesting public data, and how Panuwat’s shadow-trading theory could be applied to public officials in the future.

Keywords: SEC v. Panuwat and the Expansion of Insider Trading Enforcement; STOCK Act

Affiliations:  1: Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.; 2: Morvillo Abramowitz; 3: Morvillo Abramowitz.

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